LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF "DUTIES TO ONESELF": KANT v. NEO-KANTIANS
.M. Finnis*
I.
My duty towards myself cannot be treated juridically; the law touches only our relations with other men; I have no legal obligations towards myself; and whatever I do to myself I do to a consenting party .... I So Kant's students understood him to say in his lectures on ethics in 1780-81. At about the same time, the Critique of Pure Reason proclaimed that legislation should be guided by the Idea of "a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others." 2 And there are sentences in his own later writings which might seem to confirm the apparent meaning and interrelation of those assertions. If, therefore, my action or my condition in general can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, then anyone who hinders me in performing the action or in maintaining the condition does me an injustice .... 4 Passages such as these may seem to ally Kant with those among our contemporaries who are willing or even keen to label Kantian their political theory that (i) the state (government, the law) should be neutral amongst competing conceptions of what is good or right for individuals (the neutrality principle), and/or (ii) the state has no right to use coercion directly or indirectly to discourage conduct not harmful to persons other than those who consent to engage in it (the harm principle). If Kant did consider that his ethical and legal theory required, or was consistent with, either the neutrality principle or the harm princi-pie, that would be ground to doubt his theory. For our contemporaries' efforts to defend one or other, or both, of those two principles are notably unsuccessful. In Part II of this Paper, I examine the attempts of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin; in Part III, I examine an attempt by D.A.J. Richards, who more explicitly claims the patronage of Kant's general theory of freedom and autonomy.
As the critique of Richards' theses will suggest, however, Kant's critical writings adhere neither to the neutrality nor to the harm principle. Rather, as I argue in Part IV, they repudiate those principles.
(One who, like Kant, rejects the harm principle will reject the neutrality principle, though many who reject the neutrality principle uphold the harm principle.) Kant seems to me broadly correct in many of his practical conclusions, 5 but his defense of them is weakened, as I argue in Part V, by well-known structural weaknesses in his ethical theory.
II.
Rawls does not argue for the neutrality principle and the harm principle as such, but for a principle which, so far as its content can be specified at all, 6 seems almost identical in its force and practical implications: that "everyone should have the greatest equal liberty consistent with a similar liberty for others. ' 7 "[J]ustice as fairness requires us to show that modes of conduct interfere with the basic liberties of others or else violate some obligation or natural duty before they can be restricted."
What, then, are Rawls' arguments against the rival view, which he calls "perfectionist"? This is the view that the state has the responsibility and right to foster the good, the well-being, flourishing, and excellence, of all its citizens and to discourage them, even coercively, from at least some of the actions and dispositions which would injure, degrade, or despoil them, even some actions and dispositions which as such are "self-regarding." Rawls expressly admits that:
[T]he freedom and well-being of individuals, when measured by the excellence of their activities and works, is vastly different in value .... Comparisons of intrinsic value can obviously be made; and... judgments of value have an important place 5. But not all-not, e.g., his condonation of infanticide of illegitimate children. Id. at *336. Still, pace Richards, this paper is not concerned to discuss which of Kant's practical conclusions are sound, and which unsound.
6. For serious doubts raised about the intelligibility and specifiability of this "prin- 8. J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 331. In Rawls' terminology, all obligations are obligations of fairness and all natural duties are duties owed to others. Id. at 112, 115. On the interpretation of this passage, see H.L.A. Hart, supra note 6, at 541-42, reprinted in Reading Rawls, supra note 6, at 238. in human affairs. They are not necessarily so vague that they must fail as a workable basis for assigning rights. 9 Having conceded this, he offers two arguments against perfectionism. The first, and primary, is that perfectionist principles would not be chosen in the Original Position, in which principles to regulate social life in a well-ordered society are chosen by persons ignorant of what will be their own personal interests, beliefs, and highest ends. And perfectionist principles would not be chosen because:
To acknowledge any such standard would be, in effect, to accept a principle that might lead to a lesser religious or other liberty .... The supporting consideration advanced in the sentence last quoted suggests the fragility of the whole argument. For, in times when certain religious and moral convictions precisely were taken with great seriousness, rational people were indeed willing to admit the perfectionist principle and thereby "gamble" that the right (from their own point of view) religious and moral beliefs would be enforced. When beliefs wrong from their point of view were enforced, they did not complain that that was unfair in principle-but only that it was unjust in fact, because the beliefs were erroneous-and they sought whatever means of resistance or reform promised an opportunity to enforce correct ones. So: Rawls' argument must do without its final supporting flourish. And without that flourish it fares badly. Its premise is simply that, for reasons of sheer prudent self-interest (quite independent of morality or fairness), perfectionism would not be chosen in the Original Position. Its conclusion is that perfectionism is not a just principle. The non sequitur is obvious enough. (But it centrally flaws Rawls' entire construction in A Theory ofJustice.) The conditions of the Original Position do secure that the principles which would be chosen in it would be fair, inasmuch as those conditions systematically exclude the sources of inter-personal bias (favoritism) and thus guarantee impartiality.' 2 But 9. J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 328.
10.
Id. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 12. But the Rawlsian construction does not escape bias as between conceptions of the good and thus also as between conceptions of the person. SeeJ. Raz, The Morality of Freedom 117-33 (1986); Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in Reading Rawls, supra note 6, at 8-10. nothing in logic or in Rawls' argument, anywhere in the book, entitles him to conclude that a principle which would not be chosen in the Original Position cannot be a principle of justice in the real world.
Perfectionist principles were rejected by Rawls, not as unfair, but as inimical to the self-interest of anyone whose views or desires might conflict with some application of those principles-and to that self-interest as conceived in ignorance of moral principles and other standards of excellence. Rawls' argument is thus helpless against claims that applying "perfectionist" principle(s) will be in the best interests, truly conceived, of everyone, even of those who have to be coercively prevented fru'a damaging their own best interests.
Here, then, we come to Rawls' second argument, extractable from an uneasily shifting paragraph which begins by conceding that it is indeed not easy to argue against moderate perfectionism. "Moderate perfectionism" relies not on a single conception of the good life, to secure which all other lives must be subordinated, but on claims about the excellent and the degrading which are balanced "intuitionistically" against liberty and equality. Rawls' uneasy argument asserts first that "criteria of excellence are imprecise as political principles," and that "their application to public questions is bound to be unsettled and idiosyncratic."' 13 It then shifts abruptly to an assertion even more obviously questionable and contingent: that appeals to perfectionist criteria are made "in an ad hoc manner," and made because other criteria of political choice, consistent with (in effect) the harm principle, fail to justify proposed restrictions on conduct. But this assertion is in turn immediately qualified; it is not always but only "often" or "likely" true. 14 His conclusion is appropriately weak: "[I]t seems best to rely entirely on the [i.e., his] principles ofjustice which have a more definite structure." 15 But plainly it will "seem best" only to those who are content with the peculiar "modern conditions" of chaotic disagreement about good and evil; these are the conditions for which, alone, Rawls seeks to identify principles ofjustice.1 6 Manifestly, the whole argument, even if ac-13. J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 330. 14. Id As Dworkin later said, on his own behalf: "Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.... It must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to another's."' 8 I shall not delay on this claim that legislative protection of morals manifests official or majority contempt for those whose preferred conduct is proscribed or impeded. I think Dworkin has tacitly conceded its untenability. Briefly: it fails because such legislation may manifest, not contempt, but rather a sense of the equal worth and human dignity of those people whose conduct is outlawed precisely on the ground that it expresses a serious misconception of, and actually degrades, human worth and dignity, and thus degrades their own personal worth and dignity, along with that of others who may be induced to share in or emulate their degradation.' 9 To judge persons mistaken, and to act on that judgment, is not to be equated, in any field of human discourse or practice, with despising those persons or preferring oneself. So Dworkin has now offered a revised version of his argument. The new version relies instead on the idea of a hypothetical loss of, or judgments of justice. It has been my intention to describe constructivism by contrast and not to defend it, much less to argue that rational intuitionism is mistaken." Rawls, Kantian Constructivism, supra, at 570.
17. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 181 (1977) (emphasis added). Dworkin continues:
Men who have no idea of their own conception of the good cannot act to favor those who hold one ideal over those who hold another. The original position is well designed to enforce the abstract right to equal concern and respect, which must be understood to be the fundamental concept of Rawls' deep theory. Id 20 But this argument is as impotent as its forerunners. To forbid people's preferred conduct does not require them to "accept an argument." And if they did accept the argument on which the law is based, they would be accepting that their former preferences were indeed unworthy of them (or, if they had always recognized that, but had retained their preferences nonetheless, it would amount to an acknowledgment that they had been unconscientious). The phenomenon of conversion or, less dramatically, of regret and reform, shows that one must not identify persons (and their worth as human beings) with their current conception(s) of human good. In sum: either those whose preferred conduct is legally proscribed come to accept the concept of human worth on which the law is based, or they do not. If they do, there is no injury to their self-respect; they realize that they were in error, and may be glad of the assistance which compulsion lent to reform. (Does this sound unreal? Think of drug addicts.) And if they do not come to accept the law's view, the law leaves their self-respect unaffected; they will regard the law, rightly or wrongly, as pitiably (and damagingly) mistaken in its conception of what is good for them. They may profoundly resent the law. What they cannot accurately think is that the law does not treat them as an equal; for the justifying concern of this law, as an effort to uphold morality, is (we can here suppose) a concern for the good, the worth and the dignity of everyone without exception. [Vol. 87:433 will be helpful to observe the use to which certain words taken from that account are put by a current defender of the neutrality and harm principles, David Richards. Richards offers to derive principles of public and constitutional morality from a concept of human rights explicated "in terms of an autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals": 2 2 Crucially, the idea of "human rights" respects this capacity of persons for 23 rational autonomy-their capacity to be, in Kant's memorable phrase, free and rational sovereigns in the kingdom of ends [citation to Grundlegung *433-34]. Kant characterized this ultimate normative respect for 2 4 the revisable choice of ends as the dignity of autonomy [citation to Grundlegung *434-35], in contrast to the heteronomous, lower-order ends (pleasure, talent) among which the person may choose. Kant thus expressed the fundamental liberal imperative of moral neutrality with regard to the many disparate visions of the good life: the concern embodied in the idea of human rights is not with maximizing the agent's pursuit of any particular lower-order ends, but rather with respecting the higher-order capacity of the agent to exercise rational autonomy in choosing and revising his ends, whatever they are. 25 With the neutrality principle which he announces in that passage, Richards links a principle tantamount to the harm principle:
Consistent with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals, the principles underlying ajust criminal law require forms of action and forbearance from action that express, on terms fair to all, basic respect for the capacity of persons responsibly to pursue their ends, whatever they are. Such principles impose this constraint: only those forms of action and forbearance that violate rights of the person to forms of respect defined by the underlying principles of obligation and duty may properly be criminalized.
26
In his initial discussion of autonomy, Richards does refer to the relevance of "principles of conduct and canons of ethics to which [those exercising autonomy] have given their rational assent," and of "the capacity to use normative principles, including, inter alia, principles of rational choice, to decide which among several ends may be most The focal weight ... give[n] to the freedom and rationality of the individual as the creator of his own life is the ideal fundamental to the autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals, the basis of the human rights perspective in politics and law. 3°T he "fundamental right" which Richards derives from these considerations is the right of persons "to determine the meaning of their own lives."- 3 It is hard to find a more inexact rendering of Kant's conceptions of autonomy, rationality, dignity, and the kingdom of ends.
We might begin with the "memorable phrase" which introduces Kant as sponsor of Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law: "free and rational sovereigns in the kingdom of ends." The phrase does not, of course, occur in Kant, either at the pages from which Richards claims to have memorized it, or anywhere else. For on the pages to which Richards refers us, Kant states not only that the kingdom of ends is "certainly only an ideal," but also, and more importantly, that even a rational legislator in a kingdom of ends would not be sovereign unless he were "a completely independent being, without needs and with an unlimited power adequate to his will" 3 2 -a godlike, not a human being. [Vol. 87:433 possible through freedom and which is presented to us as an object of respect by practical reason; yet we are at the same time subjects in it, not sovereigns, and to mistake our inferior position as creatures and to deny, from self-conceit, respect to the holy law is, in spirit, a defection from it [the moral law] even if its letter be fulfilled. 33 But already in the Grundlegung, on the two pages following those cited by Richards, Kant had made pellucidly clear how different from Richards' is his understanding of the "dignity of autonomy." What has "intrinsic worth [Werth], i.e., dignity [Wuerde]" has only the worth "determined for it by the [moral] law." '3 4 "Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity." 35 The capacities mentioned by Richards (some of which are here specifically mentioned by Kant) 3 6 have a "market value [Marktpreis]" and/or an "affective [or: fancy] price [Affectionspreis]" (another merely relative value), but morally upright actions (such as fidelity in promises and benevolence on principle) have intrinsic "worth [Wuerde] ." Morally good dispositions can lay claim to dignity, just because they and only they afford to rational creatures participation in giving universal laws and thusfit such creatures to be members and legislators in a possible kingdom of ends. The maxims of rational choosers (i.e., their rationales for their choices) have dignity only when those maxims could harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends, by treating not only other persons but also each of the choosers themselves (i.e., their own rational nature) as no mere means but also an end. "Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity [Wuerde] of human nature and of every rational nature." 3 7 In short, one has autonomy just in so far as one does in fact make one's choices, not on the basis of one's interests, but out of respect for the demands of morality. 34. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *435-36. Contrast Richards, supra note 22, at 20 ("the only thing Kant claimed to be of unconditional worth, personal dignity" (citing Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *434-35)).
35. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *435. 36. These capacities, just as such, Kant in fact regards as talents, which fit one to pursue "any kind of ends" (cf. Richards' references to one's ends "whatever they are"), and which at best are worthy only of a respect which is no more than analogous to the respect due to the worth of the moral law and choice in conformity with that law. Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *41, *77-78; cf. infra note 88.
37. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *436 (emphasis added). On Kant's attribution of dignity to (i) humanity, (ii) rational nature, (iii) morality, (iv) persons, (v) those who conform to duty, and (vi) dispositions to do one's duty for duty's sake, see Hill, Humanity as an End in Itself, 91 Ethics 84, 91-92 (1980 " 42 Richards is in another world. He thinks, for example, that Kantian autonomy involves "sovereignty over the qualities of one's experience." 43 Many young heroin users in the United States enjoy such sovereignty, he says, by choosing to allow their drug use a "psychological centrality" which "may, from the perspective of their own circumstances, not unreasonably organize their lives and ends," ' 44 because that use of heroin and the like "generates its own social tasks and standards of successful achievement, its own forms of status and respect, and its own larger meaning centering on the perceived qualities that the drug brings to the users' personal experiences, such as relief of anxiety and, sometimes, euphoric peace." ' 45 Let us here ignore everything Kant ever said about drunkards and the use of euphoric opiates (and about any other particular question of duty to oneself). It remains clear that Richards has nothing but equivocation, mere punning, upon which to ground his claim that Kant's conception of autonomous freedom inherently involves such choices as the choice to become "psychologically devoted" to heroin-to sell oneself, as Kant would say, to the seductions of the inclinations (perhaps very seductive "from the perspective of one's own circumstances"). And the point here is not simply that such a choice entrains (pace Richards) enslavement, but more importantly that such "determining and revising the meaning of one's life" (afortiori choosing to find that "meaning" in "personal experiences") 46 is utterly remote from Kant's autonomy; the rational identification of, and respectful submission to, the moral law which, precisely as universal, imposes on each one of us duties to oneself. But what about Kant's conception of freedom? I shall have more to say about Kantian freedoms in the next section. But I should say something about the conception of freedom that is, for Kant, the conception relevant to, and on the same plane as, his ethical conception of autonomy. The main thing to be said is that this freedom-freedom in the strictest sense-is known only through our consciousness of the moral law. 4 s And "the human will by virtue of its freedom is directly determined by the moral law"; 49 man "is the subject of the moral law which is holy, because of the autonomy of his freedom." 50 To be conscious of freedom indeed precisely is to be conscious of the moral law. 5 1 If the will is not determined by the moral law, it is not free, for it is determined either by that law or by inclinations 5 2 -but to be determined by inclinations is precisely to be subject to heteronomy, i.e., to lack autonomy. 5 3 Thus "the autonomy of the will is the sole principle"-not merely the presupposition-"of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them." 54 But, of course, individuals are conscious of their own freedom not only through their awareness of being able to resist the seduction of the inclinations, but also through their experience of being able to reject the categorical imperatives of morality. In a strategic paragraph of his lectures on ethics, Kant holds before his hearers the double significance of freedom. First, freedom is "the inner value of the world." For: "The inherent value of the world, the summum bonum, is freedom in accordance with a will which is not necessitated to action. stressing that Kant's concept of giving law to oneself has nothing to do with Richards' concept of "meaning giving," I do not wish to suggest that Kant's conception of selflegislation is any more coherent than his conception of the self. See, e.g., K. Ward, The Development of Kant' were not kept within bounds by objective rules, the result would be the completest savage disorder. There could then be no certainty that man might not use his powers to destroy himself, his fellows, and the whole of nature.
56
Sophisticates may smile at Kant's references here and elsewhere 57 to savage disorder, wild lawless freedom, and so forth. Anarchy, one may feel, belongs to the past, or to other peoples. But Kant is here 58 thinking on principle, not primarily predictively or prudentially, 59 let alone pictorially. His "savage disorder" can be exemplified not only by the eighties gay-bar/bathhouse, in which lust courts even homicide and self-destruction, but also by the coolly unprincipled national choice to treat North Atlantic democracy as exempt from the moral law against murder by preparations and readiness to carry out a vast holocaust of innocents (and even of "the whole of nature") in the face of defeat.
60
At all events, Kant's precise purpose in holding before his students the Janus faces of freedom was, by inducing in them a sense of freedom's grandeur and facility for degradation, to persuade them of the (moral) necessity of respecting humanity (rationality, the source of all worth) in oneself, as the precondition for respecting it in the person of others. In that very paragraph he proceeds to identify and condemn certain "victimless" or "self-regarding" moral evils which excite 56 Richards' broadly approving concern: drug use, sodomy, and suicide. And the same paragraph states the principle of Kant's condemnation:
The supreme rule is that in all actions which affect himself a man should so conduct himself that every exercise of his power[s] is compatible with the fullest employment of them.... The conditions under which alone the fullest use of freedom is possible, and can be in harmony with itself, are the essential ends of humanity. It must conform with these. The principle of all duties is that the use of freedom must be in keeping with the essential ends of humanity. It is time to consider more directly whether Kant thought that his ethical and political or legal theory required or was consistent with the "harm principle" which I identified and labelled in Part I. For besides the freedom with which Part III was concerned, there is, of course, another freedom: the political or natural-law liberty which Kant calls outer or external freedom. And: "Freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law [nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz], is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity." ' 6 3 Like the passages from Kant which I quoted in Part I, this may seem to confirm that Kant thought it wrong for the law of a state to hinder one's violation of one's moral duties to oneself. That Kant did indeed thus subscribe to the harm principle is maintained by good commentators, such as Mary Gregor:
61. Duties to Oneself, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 123-24. He expresses the same principle in the words used in his later moral writings: "actions must be in keeping with humanity itself." Id. at 125; see id. at 121. 62. Id. at 121. Having reached the end of this Part, readers will note that of the 45 passages from Kant which are cited in it against Richards' interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy, only one involves Kant's "casuistry," i.e., his views on sex, drugs, killing, the harm principle, etc. For the whole section is concerned with his fundamental "philosophical vision," a vision in which it is simply false to say that moral reasonableness constrains only "interpersonal conduct" (as Richards continues to claim in, for example, his reply at text accompanying note 22 of his comment). Richards' main defense against my critique-viz, his assertion that my "interpretive approach puts a fundamental weight on Kant's casuistry" (etc., etc.)-will be found surprising not only by readers of this Part but also any who read Part IV, in which I do say something about Kant's casuistry, in its place. Whether Richards himself adheres to his sensible principles of interpretation when he turns to my own works, readers will easily judge.
63. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *237.
[Vol. 87:433 The most obvious difficulty which the interpretation faces is that Kant displays no discomfort with criminal laws forbidding conduct which seems "self-regarding," i.e., not harmful to others. In the supplementary explanations he appended to the second edition of the Rechtslehre, Kant discusses the proper measure of punishment required by his principle of talion. His discussion touches on "crimes ... called unnatural because they are committed against humanity itself": rape, pederasty, and bestiality. 6 5 The list suggests Kant's lack of interest in the harm principle; even if Paederastie be read (which it by no means need be) as restricted to perverted sexual acts with a child, and even if the child's consent is discounted and psychological and moral harm to the child is conceded, there remains Kant's reference to bestiality, conduct which in itself affects no other person. The appropriate punishment for bestiality, in Kant's view, is permanent expulsion from civil society, since "the criminal guilty of bestiality is unworthy of remaining in human society." 6 6 All this the conventional interpretation would 65. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 3, at *363. One aspect of the meaning of "against humanity itself" is shown by the phrase id. at *362-63 "the respect due the humanity in the person of the miscreant (that is, due the human species)"; cf. infra note 68.
66. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *366. The next sentence in have to explain away as some sort of slip, or mere gross inconsistency (and hands might be waved in the direction of Kant's "pietistic upbringing," and so forth). Almost equally obvious, and perhaps more telling, is the account ofjuridical duties to oneself, an account which Kant gives eight or nine pages after the passages in the Rechtslehre which are principally relied upon by the conventional interpretation. In the earlier passages, as will be recalled from section I above, Kant Gregor has argued that Kant operates with two completely different conceptions of "juridical duty," one treating duties as juridical (rather than ethical) according to the type of legislation and/or constraint (in particular, external penalty) accompanying the law creating them, and the other treating duties as juridical (rather than ethical) according as they relate to actions themselves (rather than merely to the maxims of actions). She is thus enabled to maintain that while juridical my text predicted the sort of response which, in the event, Richards has made. 67. Id. at *230.
68. Id. at *239-40. This distinction between the right of Menschheit in one's own person and the right of Menschen in the person of others is one of the reasons why I am unpersuaded by Fletcher's view that "the Kantian ideal is clearly communitarian, for our focus is not on our own selves, but on the vindication of the dignity of all human kind.... [S]olidarity [for Kant] is more important than the fulfillment of the private self." Fletcher, supra note 64, at 176, 177. As to the point made in my text, which is fundamental to my interpretation of Kant's views on legal enforcement of duties to (humanity in) oneself, I may record that in the "close parsing" to which note 14 of Richards' comment appeals for support, Douglas Dryer felt obliged to declare that the table in Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at 240 is false to Kant's "mature view" (published virtually simultaneously) not just in one but in two respects. He also asserted that the correct translation of "Rechtspflichten" is one not hitherto adopted in any of the published English translations ("duties for which there are correlative rights"). I do not say he was mistaken, though I find the proposed translation surprising. Anyway, Dryer's strong measures with Kant's text were of a piece with his willingness to junk Kant's still more mature statements about bestiality (and, probably, pederasty). Id. at *363.
[Vol. 87:433 duties in the first sense must relate to other men, juridical duties in the second sense can relate to uses of one's own person. 6 9 Thus she seeks to preserve her view that Kant restricted the proper field of state law to actions affecting others, and thus upheld something approximating the harm principle.
I think her attempt fails. All on the same two pages of the Rechtslehre to which I have referred, Kant lays it down explicitly that juridical duties may be enforced by external legislation and that juridical duties include duties to oneself (as distinct from duties to others). It is not credible that he has here passed from one sense of "juridical" to another quite different sense, without seeking to relate the one to the other, and quite unconscious of the confusion such a transition would create.
Moreover, Kant in fact takes care, then and there, to explain why duties which are not juridical but merely ethical are not proper subjects of external legislation. And his explanation has nothing to do with the right to freedom (still less with Richards' "autonomy" or Justice Brandeis' "right to be let alone" 70 ). It is simply that the subject-matter of ethical duties is an internal act of the mind-as he says elsewhere, "intentions and not actions only" 7 1 -that no external legislation can bring about. 7 2 (He adds, however, that external legislation can command actions which would be conducive to that internal virtue and its end. 7 3 ) Thus Kant incorporates Gregor's proposed "different point of view" (her second sense of "juridical duty") 74 within his explanation of juridical duty in her first sense, and then moves promptly and smoothly to his flat denial that juridical duties must be duties to others. Here, then, we have Kant's explicit theoretical framework for affirming the propriety, in principle, of external (e.g., state) laws proscribing and penalizing pederasty and bestiality (to go no further than Kant's own later examples).
But what are we to make of the passages which I quoted in Part I and have amplified in the last paragraph but one?
Observe, first, that in the many passages of the Rechtslehre which speak of one's will, freedom, action, or condition coexisting with the will, etc., of others, Kant always adds a further necessary condition: that the coexistence, consistency or compatibility of wills, etc., be "in accord-69. M. Gregor, supra note 64, at 115-16. 
1987]
ance with a universal law." 75 Our contemporary neo-Kantians standardly omit this condition (as Kant himself had omitted it fifteen years earlier, in the Critique of Pure Reason, with a glancing and rhetorical reference to a constitution "of the greatest human freedom"). Other interpreters, e.g., Fletcher, do not overlook it, but read it down as requiring merely that the choices be compatible "as these choices are universalized across the legal system as a whole." 76 I suggest, however, that the phrase "in accordance with a universal law" was certainly meant to import Kant's own conception expounded in the three principal forms or formulations of the categorical imperative-(i) universalizability of form, (ii) respect of humanity as an end in itself, (iii) harmonization of individual maxims within a kingdom of ends-"fundamentally only so many formulas of the very same law." 77 Now, as Kant indicated in the Grundlegung, a genuine universal law contains the ground not only of duties to others but also of duties to oneself. 78 Hence, in insisting that, to be right, one's will must not only be compatible with others' wills but must be "in accordance with a universal law," Kant was indicating why certain acts and choices, fully compatible with the wills of others, are nonetheless violations of perfect juridical duties to oneself-duties which, being juridical, can in principle be legally enforced. As he says a little further on in the Rechtslehre, recalling the Grundlegung's second formulation of the categorical imperative, one has a juridical duty "[t]o assert[] one's own worth as a human being in relation to others, and this duty is expressed in the proposition: 'Do not make yourself into a mere means for others, but be at the same time an end for them.' -79 (Here one can recall Kant's view that the essence of the "carnal crimes against nature," and of sexual promiscuity in general, is that human beings do thereby make themselves mere objects of enjoyment for someone's sexual desire. Such conduct, even if it can coexist with the conduct of others, thus cannot do so "in accordance with a universal law." 8 0 )
What, then, of the passage in which Kant states that the concept of Recht applies only to the external relationship of one person to another, 75 . Notably Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *230-31. The syntax is ambiguous, and it may well be right to prefer Abbott's translation: "Act externally so that the free use of thy elective will may not interfere with the freedom of any man so far as it agrees with universal law." Kant' [Vol. 87:433 in so far as the action of one person can directly or indirectly affect the other? I will say nothing here about the extent to which Kant's reference to indirect effects might erode the harm principle. Rather, I shall simply recall that Kant's whole treatment of the question "What is Recht?" remains within the conventional framework of Western thought, a framework which he here recalls by his use of the Latin, quid sit iuris, and his use of justum and injustum to translate Recht and Unrecht. 8 1 In that traditional framework, justice and right are conceptually tied to relationships of one person to (an)other(s). 8 2 Thomas Aquinas, for example, would have no difficulty in saying that an act of recreational use of heroin (or consensual homosexual intercourse) is not, or not necessarily, an act of injustice or a violation of anyone else's right. But he and the tradition would add that it does not follow that theprohibition of such acts is an act of injustice or a violation of right. Nor does such an act of prohibition fall outside Kant's conception of the sphere of Recht; it precisely satisfies the criterion of that conception: an act which applies to the "external and . . . practical relationship of one person [here: the lawgiver or the sovereign] to another" in which the action of the former can exert an influence on the actions of the latter. 8 3 In the last analysis, the conceptual framework articulated in Kant's paragraph on the concept of Recht does not seem in any way intended to settle disputed questions about the proper range of state law. At the very least, it offers no normative premises for a normative conclusion such as the harm principle.
There remains only the passage which I put at the head of this Paper: "My duty towards myself cannot be treated juridically; the law touches only our relations with other men . . . ." It is a passage from the students' transcription of Kant's lectures of 1780-81, and as such it cannot stand against the clear statements, both general and particular, in the long-gestated Rechtslehre. 8 one's own or others' inclinations, is a duty which can only be truly and fully fulfilled by maintaining a certain intention/disposition (Gesinnung)-and there is a sense in which the state's law, as such, indeed cannot reach or "treat" dispositions. All that the law can do directly is authorize one man (the executive sovereign, Kant would say) to interfere with the actions of another, e.g., the pederast.
V.
But why interfere with those actions? Kant's claim-a matter of ethics-that such actions are immoral ("violations of duties to oneself") is inadequately argued. And he fails to offer any significant argumentation for his evident view-a matter of political theory-that the state can rightly punish such violations of duties to oneself, even when they violate no duty to others. I must say something about the roots of Kant's failure to supply the argumentation required for this theorem of his political theory. But I shall here say little or nothing about the justmentioned deficiency in his ethical theory, 85 though my discussion of the weaknesses of Kant's political theory will hint at how I think his ethical theory might be enriched in ways that would allow the immorality of (i.e., the unreasonableness and self-mutilation inherent in) human actions of these types to be articulated and clarified.
The political-philosophical principle which Kant needs, and virtually lacks, is the principle that the point and justification of state law is the common good. As L.T. Hobhouse put it in his classic exposition of liberalism:
The common good includes the good of every member of the community, and the injury which a man inflicts upon himself is matter of common concern, even apart from any ulterior effect upon others. If we refrain from coercing a man for his own good, it is not because his good is indifferent to us, but because it cannot be furthered by coercion. [1911] . Thus Hobhouse rejects Mill's distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts (and the principle Mill sought to found on it): "first because there are no actions which may not directly or indirectly affect others, secondly because even if there were they would not cease to be matter of concern to others." Id. But he goes on to argue, in rather Kantian fashion, that "[t]o try to form character by coercion is to destroy it in the making," or (weaker version) "it is [Vol. 87:433
So far as I know, Kant's own publications scarcely discuss, in a political context, the question of fact which Hobhouse thus raises: can the good of a human person be advanced by coercion? 8 7 In an ethical context, Kant does advance a very weak argument against making the perfection of (an)other(s) one's responsibility. The happiness of others is among one's fundamental responsibilities, but not their perfection, for:
it is contradictory to say that I make another person's perfection my end and consider myself obligated to promote this. For the perfection of another man, as a person, consists precisely in his own power to adopt his end in accordance with his own concept of duty; and it is self-contradictory to demand that I do (make it my duty to do) what only the other person himself can do. 88 This will not do. We can agree that the necessary condition of human perfection is indeed authenticity: that one has adopted one's commitments in accordance with one's own conception of duty. But I deny that education, coercive deterrence, and coercive denial of opportunities can do nothing to assist persons to avoid choices which will degrade or in some other way harm them. And in several of his unpublished reflections, as we shall see, Kant admits that coercive measures can indeed be efficacious for this purpose.
It is important, at this point, to make a distinction. Coercing people to adopt or profess a religion is-if attempted for religious motives-self-stultifying in a way which could merit Kant's protean word "(self-)contradictory." For the good of adherence to the propositions of religious faith intrinsically involves that the propositions be adhered to as true, i.e., as disclosing a transcendent reality which is afit object of adoration, petitionary prayer, and so forth. To the extent that the propositions are professed because their profession is convenient, both they and the professing of them obscure rather than disclose that reality.
But there is nothing analogously self-stultifying in coercing people to abstain from drug-taking or pederasty, whether by threatening them with criminal penalties, or by threatening those who would supply them with opportunities for indulgence in the vice, or merely by threatening not possible to compel morality because morality is the act or character of a free agent." Id. He admits exceptions:
[I]n the case of the drunkard-and I think the argument applies to all cases where overwhelming impulse is apt to master the will-it is a[n] ... elementary duty to remove the sources of temptation, and to treat as anti-social in the highest degree every attempt to make profit out of human weakness, misery, and wrong-doing. Id. at 81.
87. Unless one counts the statement noted supra note 73 and accompanying text. 88. The Doctrine of Virtue, supra note 41, at *385 (emphasis in original). There is no need to dwell here on the fact that Kant's conception of perfection is here, in Rawlsian terminology, a "thin theory." See supra note 36. those who would corrupt them while young. Nor has it been demonstrated that this need render the persons coerced unfit to integrate their characters around other personal commitments, freely chosen by them from the vast range of diverse but upright forms of life. 89 Nor indeed has it been demonstrated that Western tradition was mistaken in holding, with Aristotle and Aquinas, that people who are prone to vice, and resistant to verbal persuasion, not only can be restrained by coercive threats from depraved actions but also can often be led-by an acculturation which those philosophers called habituation-to make, willingly (i.e., by their own authenticfree choice), the very types of choices (to abstain from vice and to pursue worthwhile commitments) which, earlier, they made only "under coercion" and unwillingly. 90 And it is clear that Kant shared the factual judgment made by the tradition: "Man must be trained, so as to become domesticated and become virtuous later on. The coercion of government [Regirungszwang] and education make him supple, flexible and obedient to the laws; then reason will rule." 91 But Kant could not bring this factual premise into conjunction with a normative premise about the common good.
For a workable conception of the common good requires that we reject several of the notorious Kantian dualisms. There is first the dualism of the phenomenal world (including human persons) subject to the reign of natural determinism and impulse versus the noumenal realm of "selves" or "subjects," of free will and moral law. The second dualism
